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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Ryan Johnson appeals from his Judgment of Conviction and Commitment, 
stemming from a jury finding him guilty of domestic violence with traumatic injury in the 
presence of a child. The State alleged and the evidence suggested that Mr. Johnson 
was engaged in four, distinct confrontations with his ex-wife, and he claimed he acted in 
self-defense. Mr. Johnson asserts that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, 
the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that they must be unanimous in their 
determination of which of the alleged batteries constituted the necessary element of the 
crime charged. Furthermore, Mr. Johnson asserts that the district court abused its 
sentencing discretion and that his unified sentence of fifteen years, with three years 
fixed, is excessive. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The State filed a Amended Complaint alleging that Ryan Johnson had committed 
the crime of domestic violence in the presence of a child (Count I) and attempted 
strangulation (Count II), on October 5, 2011, and a second charge of domestic violence 
in the presence of a child (Count Ill), occurring the week earlier on September 26, 
2011. 1 (R, pp.22-23.) During the preliminary hearing, Melissa Johnson testified that a 
verbal argument regarding her oldest son's cell phone became physical when 
Mr. Johnson shoved her into the bathtub and started "tossing [her] around" as she was 
1 The jury ultimately found Mr. Johnson not guilty of attempted strangulation as alleged 
in Count II, and guilty of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor domestic battery in 
Count Ill (the September 26, 2011 incident). Mr. Johnson does not challenge his 
misdemeanor domestic battery conviction or sentence in this appeal. 
1 
getting ready for work. 2 (Tr. Prelim, p.7, L.7 - p.10, L.16.)3 Ms. Johnson went on to 
describe two more distinct alleged batteries - one occurring in the bedroom, one 
occurring in the living room, and an alleged attempted strangulation occurring in the 
kitchen area near the back door. (Tr. Prelim, p.12, L.10 - p.24, L.3.) The magistrate 
court found probable cause and Mr. Johnson was bound over into the district court. 
(R., pp.24-26.) 
The State filed an Information charging three counts: Count I - domestic violence 
in the presence of a child; Count II - attempted strangulation; and, Count Ill - domestic 
violence in the presence of a child, alleged to have occurred a little over one week 
earlier than the incidents alleged in counts I and II. (R, pp.27-28.) In Count I, the State 
alleged, in relevant part, that Mr. Johnson "did willfully and unlawfully use force or 
violence upon the person of Melissa Johnson by restraining her, throwing her down, 
slapping her in the face, hitting her on the head, and/or by throwing her into a bathtub." 
(R., p.28.) 
Prior to trial, Mr. Johnson requested that the district court instruct the jury that 
they must be unanimous as to which alleged acts constitute the alleged battery in Count 
I, as each act could constitute a separate crime. (Tr. 2/9/12, p.4, L.13 - p.10, L.B.) 
Mr. Johnson argued that "Ms. Johnson, Melissa, has in her statements says that things 
occur in the bedroom and they occur in the bathroom and then they occur in the living 
room. There's no allegation that he was dragging her between those in one act." 
2 Ms. Johnson testified that she lived in the house with AL., her 16 year-old son from a 
previous relationship, C.J., her 7 year-old son, and M.J., her 5 year-old daughter, both 
of whom are also Ryan Johnson's children. The Johnsons were divorced; however, 
Mr. Johnson was living at the house at the time of the alleged incidents. (Tr. Prelim, 
p.4, L. 12 - p.6, L. 12.) 
2 
(Tr. 2/9/12, p.4, L.21 - p.5, L.2.) Although the prosecutor acknowledged that there were 
breaks in between the alleged batteries, the district court ultimately found that a 
unanimity instruction was not required and denied the request. (Tr. 2/9/12, p.5, L.18 -
p.14, L.1.) 
During trial, Ms. Johnson testified that as she was getting ready for work on 
October 5, 2011, Mr. Johnson started yelling at her about the use of a cell phone, he 
came into the bathroom and pushed her into the bathtub, and then he started grabbing 
her by the arms and throwing her around in the tub. (Tr., p.251, L.1 - p.254, L.7.)4 
According to Ms. Johnson, Mr. Johnson stopped, left the bathroom, and went into the 
dining room. (Tr. p.255, Ls.6-11.) Ms. Johnson then got out of the bathtub and went 
into her bedroom. (Tr. p.255, Ls.12-15.) 
While she was in her bedroom, Mr. Johnson entered and threw Ms. Johnson 
down on the bed, and she repeatedly tried to get up but he kept pushing her down. 
(Tr., p.255, L.16 - p.256, L.8.) Mr. Johnson then allegedly held Ms. Johnson down by 
the arms. (Tr., p.256, Ls.9-19.) Ms. Johnson testified that she managed to get an arm 
loose, grabbed Mr. Johnson's genitals and squeezed "pretty hard," and IVlr. Johnson 
struck her in the face with an open hand. (Tr. p.256, L.20 - p.257, L.24.) Mr. Johnson 
got off of Ms. Johnson, grabbed her phone, and then left the bedroom moving into the 
living room. (Tr. p.257, L.25 - p.258, L.19.) 
Ms. Johnson testified that she then followed Mr. Johnson into the living room 
asking for her phone back and a verbal argument ensued. (Tr., p.258, L.20 - p.259, 
3 The transcript of the preliminary hearing was included as an Exhibit to the Clerk's 
Record (R., p.174), and is contained in the electronic file "39870 State v. Johnson 
Pre Tran." 
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L.1.) She testified that she then stuck her hand into Mr. Johnson's pocket to retrieve 
her phone. (Tr., p.259, Ls.2-13.) Mr. Johnson then allegedly turned around and pushed 
Ms. Johnson to the floor, she tried to get up and he pushed her down again, getting on 
top of her and holding her hands down. (Tr., p.259, Ls.14-25.) Ms. Johnson testified 
that Mr. Johnson then told C.J. (who was on the couch at the time) that he would give 
him the phone so that C.J. could call 911. (Tr., p.260, Ls.6-13.) However, Ms. Johnson 
told C.J. to go downstairs and he did so. (Tr., p.260, L.22 - p.261, L.4.) Ms. Johnson 
then bit Mr. Johnson and he got off of her. (Tr. p.261, L.5 - p.262, L.3.) 
Ms. Johnson testified that she then got up, grabbed her phone, and yelled at C.J. 
to come upstairs so they could leave. (Tr., p.262, Ls.4-9.) As she was walking toward 
the back door, Ms. Johnson testified that Mr. Johnson grabbed her "hoody" and put his 
hand on her throat and squeezed. (Tr., p.262, Ls.10-25.) Mr. Johnson allegedly let go 
when he could see that Ms. Johnson could not breathe. (Tr., p.264, Ls.17-21.) 
Ms. Johnson and C.J. then left out of the back door. (Tr. p.264, L.22 - p.265, L.2.) 
Ryan Johnson testified that, on October 5th , he and Ms. Johnson got into a verbal 
argument about his use of AL.'s cell phone. (Tr., p.405, L.8 - p.408, L.3.) Mr. Johnson 
testified that while he was standing in the doorway of the bathroom, Ms. Johnson came 
after him swinging her arms, attempting to either scratch, or strike him, and he put his 
arms up for protection, diverting her swing and pushing her back into the bathtub. 
(Tr., p.408, L.10 - p.410, L.24.) He tried to grab her as she was falling so that she 
would not be injured. (Tr., p.410, L.25 - p.411, L.18.) Mr. Johnson denied striking 
Ms. Johnson. (Tr., p.411, Ls.19-20.) 
4 References to the bound transcript containing the pre-trial hearings occurring on 
February 1 and 8, the jury trial held February 13 and 14, and the sentencing hearing 
occurring on April 4, 2012, will be cited as "Tr." herein. 
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Mr. Johnson testified that he left the bathroom and went into the dining room, and 
he turned around just as Ms. Johnson began striking him with a metal wind chime. 
(Tr., p.412, L.4 - p.413, L.21.) He testified that he grabbed Ms. Johnson's wrists to 
subdue her, she dropped the wind chime, and he let go of her. (Tr. p.413, L.12 - p.414, 
L.14.) 
Mr. Johnson then continued to the living room, grabbing AL.'s phone on the way, 
he sat down on the couch next to C.J. and he began deleting numbers he had 
previously called from the phone. (Tr., p.414, L.15 - p.415, L.11.) Ms. Johnson again 
came after him trying to pry the phone out of his hands; Mr. Johnson tossed the phone 
on the floor, but Ms. Johnson continued to slap and scratch him. (Tr., p,.415, L.12 -
p.416, L.20.) Mr. Johnson then pushed Ms. Johnson backwards, she tripped on a 
coffee table, and she landed on her stomach. (Tr., p.416, L.16 - p.417, L.23.) He then 
got on top of her and pinned her down to keep her from coming after him again. 
(Tr., p.417, L.24 - p.418, L.21.) Mr. Johnson told C.J. to call the police; however, 
Ms. Johnson ordered C.J. to go downstairs and he obeyed his mother. (Tr., p.418, L.22 
-p.419, L.13.) 
Ms. Johnson bit Mr. Johnson on the arm and grabbed his genitals and he got off 
of her. (Tr., p.419, L.14 - p. 420, L.6.) Mr. Johnson then went outside and smoked a 
cigarette while Ms. Johnson gathered her things and yelled for C.J. to come upstairs. 
(Tr., p.420, L.9 - p.421, L.9.) After he came back inside, Mr. Johnson attempted to 
speak to his son and, as he tried to get by Ms. Johnson, she again pushed him. 
(Tr., p.421, Ls.7-16.) Mr. Johnson then grabbed her by her sweats~1irt, she spit in his 
face, and he held her against the wall telling her to stop attacking him. (Tr., p.421, L.10 
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- p.423, L.17.) Mr. Johnson denied putting his hands on her throat. (Tr., p.422, Ls.8-
13.) After he let her go, Ms. Johnson and C.J. left the residence. (Tr., p.423, Ls.14-21.) 
C.J. testified that his parents were "yelling" while they were in the bedroom and 
he was on the couch. (Tr., p.482, L.1 - p.485, L. 18.) He then heard yelling in the 
kitchen. (Tr., p.486, Ls.17-22.) C.J. testified that his parents then moved into the living 
room where Mr. Johnson said '"I'm not leaving"' - Mr. Johnson pushed Ms. Johnson, 
then Ms. Johnson pushed him back, then Mr. Johnson pushed her again. (Tr., p.486, 
L.23 - p.488, L.12.) Ms. Johnson fell on the ground and Mr. Johnson put her hands 
behind her back. (Tr., p.488, Ls.13-23.) C.J. testified that Mr. Johnson threw his mom's 
phone to him and told him to call 911 but he did not do so. (Tr., p.488, L.24 - p.489, 
L.25.) He testified that he stayed in the living room until they left. (Tr., p.490, Ls.1-20.) 
He did not see anything happen as they were leaving for the car. (Tr., p.490, Ls.18-20.) 
C.J. testified that he saw Mr. Johnson spit on 1\/ls. Johnson but he did not see any other 
hitting or swinging by either of his parents. (Tr., p.490, L.21 - p.491, L.18.) He testified 
that his mom was crying and said, "'Don't break my arm"' when Mr. Johnson had her 
hands behind her back on the living room floor. (Tr., p.492, L.23 - p.493, L.B.) 
However, C.J. testified that he never saw anything happen to his mother's neck and that 
his mother was also yelling at his father. (Tr., p.495, Ls.11-18.) 
As to Count I, the jurors were instructed in relevant part as follows: 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Domestic Battery with 
Traumatic Injury in the Presence of a Child, as charged in Count I, the 
state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about the 5th day of October 2011 
2. in the state of Idaho 
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3. the defendant RYAN LEE JOHNSON committed a 
battery upon Melissa Johnson by restraining her, throwing her 
down, slapping her in the face, hitting her on the head, and/or by 
throwing her into a bathtub 
4. while they were household members, and 
5. in doing so the defendant willfully inflicted a traumatic injury 
upon Melissa Johnson, and 
6. the Defendant committed such offense in the physical 
presence of a child under sixteen (16) years of age. 
(R., p.121.) The jury was provided with a general verdict form, not requiring the jurors 
to unanimously determine which of the alleged batteries constituted the battery element 
of the domestic violence charge. (R., p.102.) The jurors were also instructed on self-
defense. (R., pp.130-131.) Mr. Johnson was found guilty in Count I, not guilty in Count 
II (attempted strangulation), and guilty of the lesser included offense of domestic battery 
in Count Ill. (R., pp.102-104.) 
The district court that sentenced Mr. Johnson did not preside over the trial but 
stated that the court had listened to an audio of the trial. 5 (Tr., p.519, L.25 - p.520, L.2.) 
The State requested a unified term of fifteen years, with four years fixed, while counsel 
for Mr. Johnson requested that the court retain jurisdiction. (Tr., p.517, Ls.17-18, p.524, 
Ls.16-18.) Based upon uncharged, unproven allegations contained in the PSI and the 
court's belief that the jurors simply misunderstood the attempted strangulation 
instruction, the court indicated that it considered Mr. Johnson to have in fact put his 
hands on Ms. Johnson's throat and sentenced him to a unified term of fifteen years, with 
5 The Honorable William Woodland presided over the trial while the Honorable Cheri 
Copsey presided over the sentencing hearing. 
7 
three years fixed, without retaining jurisdiction. (R., pp.140-144; Tr., p.527, L.11 -
p.533, L.11.) Mr. Johnson filed a timely Notice of Appeal. 6 (R., pp.150-153.) 
6 Mr. Johnson also filed a timely Rule 35 motion, seeking leniency, which was denied by 
the court. (R., pp.146-149, 155-161.) In light of the relevant standards of review, 
Mr. Johnson does not raise the issue of the district court's denial of his Rule 35 motion 
in this appeal. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Johnson's request for a unanimity 
instruction? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence in 




The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Johnson's Request For A Unanimity Instruction 
A. Introduction 
Jurors in Idaho must unanimously agree on a guilty verdict. Ryan Johnson, 
Melissa Johnson, and C.J. all described multiple conflicts occurring in various places in 
the house, with short but discernible breaks in between. Mr. Johnson admitted to 
putting his hands on Ms. Johnson on four occasions although he claimed he did so in 
self-defense. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the district court was 
required to instruct the jurors that they must unanimously agree on which of the alleged 
batteries constituted the alleged domestic violence. Furthermore, as Mr. Johnson 
requested the instruction, preserving the issue for appeal, the State has the burden of 
proving the district court's error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State 
will be unable to do so and this Court should vacate Mr. Johnson's conviction for Count 
I. 
B. Idaho Law Requires Jurors To Be Unanimous Where The Evidence 
Demonstrates That Multiple, Distinct, Complete Crimes Are Alleged Even If The 
Crimes Are Alleged Under A Single Count 
Jurors must be instructed on all of the matters of law necessary for their 
consideration, including "instructions on rules of law that are 'material to the 
determination of a defendant's guilt or innocence."' State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 
710 (2009) (citing I.C. § 19-2132 and quoting State v. Mack, 132 Idaho 480, 483 (Ct. 
App. 1999)). Idaho law requires a trial court to instruct the jury that they must 
unanimously agree on the defendant's guilt in order for the defendant to be convicted. 
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Id. at 711 (citing Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 267-268 (Ct. App. 2000).) However, "An 
instruction that the jury must unanimously agree on the facts giving rise to the offense 
... is generally not required." Id. (emphasis added) (citing State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 
13, 19 (1999); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631 (1991 ).) Nevertheless, due process 
bars states from convicting a person for a violation of a generic category of "crime" 
based upon any combination of facts the state sees fit to allege. Schad, at 633. As 
Justice Scalia has observed, "We would not permit, for example, an indictment charging 
that the defendant assaulted either X on Tuesday or Y on Wednesday." Id. at 651 
(Scalia, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.) 
In Severson, the defendant was alleged to have murdered his wife by alternative 
means - either by suffocating her or by poisoning her. Severson, at 701. The 
defendant argued that the district court was required to instruct the jury that they must 
be unanimous in determining the means by which he allegedly committed the murder. 
Id. at 710. In rejecting Severson's argument, the Idaho Supreme Court found "the trial 
court in this case was not required to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree on 
the means by which Severson killed his wife" because he "was charged with the single 
act of murdering his wife." Id. at 712. Furthermore, the Court reasoned, 
Although the evidence showed that Severson could have murdered his 
wife by either overdosing her or suffocating her, it did not indicate that 
separate incidents involving distinct unions of mens rea and actus reus 
occurred. The very nature of the crime of murder eliminates this 
possibility. Absent evidence of more than one instance in which Severson 
engaged in the charged conduct, the jury was not required to unanimously 
agree on the facts giving rise to the offense. 
Id. The Court recognized that the defendant could not be convicted of the single charge 
of murdering his wife on more than one occasion; thus, the district court did not err by 
failing to give a unanimity instruction. Id. 
11 
However, Idaho Courts have long recognized that a unanimity instructions is 
necessary where separate crimes, requiring proof of distinct unions of mens rea and 
actus reus, are alleged, even where the separate crimes are alleged in one count. The 
ultimate question is whether each alleged incident was part of a single course of 
conduct. State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410,414 (1986). As the Major Court noted, the 
distinct between whether a course of conduct constitutes one or multiple offense is 
important as, 
to charge a defendant with two offenses when only one was committed 
violates the defendant's right against double jeopardy, U.S. Const. amend. 
V, Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13; conversely, to charge a defendant with 
one offense when more than one was committed can prejudice the 
defendant "in the shaping of evidentiary rulings, in producing a 
conviction on less than a unanimous verdict as to each separate 
offense, in sentencing, in limiting review on appeal, and in exposing the 
defendant to double jeopardy." Criminal Procedure, § 19.2(e), p. 457. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261 (Ct. App. 2000), the Idaho Court of appeals held 
that the "act or acts" language contained in Idaho Code § 18-1508 ("Lewd conduct with 
a minor child under sixteen"), does not "allow for a continuing course of conduct 
element. Rather, the legislature's use of the plural is a recognition that a series of 
sexual contacts by different means which occur as a part of a single incident, i.e., a 
continuous transaction without significant breaks, are to be charged as a single 
count of lewd conduct." Id. at 266 (emphasis added). Based upon the evidence 
presented at trial, the Miller Court found that the defendant was alleged to have 
committed six separate acts of manual to genital contact and that trial counsel was 
deficient in failing to request a unanimity instruction (although the court found there was 
no prejudice). Id. at 267-269. 
12 
Furthermore, in State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 33-34 (1997), the Idaho Supreme 
Court rejected the defendant's argument that his double jeopardy rights were violated 
based upon his being charged with and convicted of both lewd conduct and infamous 
crime against nature, as each act of fellatio performed on the victim were separate and 
distinct. The Court found, 
The first sexual assault took place on J.S.'s bed. The second assault took 
place on J.S.'s couch. The amended information clearly required proof of 
these different facts. Further, other events occurred in between these acts 
of sexual assault. After the first assault, J.S. was pulled off the bed and 
thrown onto the couch where Bush told J.S. he wanted J.S. to engage in 
fellatio. J.S. refused and was pushed to his knees and Bush tied a t-shirt 
around J.S.'s face. Bush again placed J.S. on the couch and tied his arms 
behind his back with a cord. It was after these events that the second act 
of sexual assault occurred. Bush then again placed J.S.'s penis in his 
mouth for five to ten minutes. These facts appear to demonstrate that 
there were two separate and distinct sexual assaults committed on J.S. 
Id. at 34. Similarly, in State v. Grinolds, 121 Idaho 673 (1992), the Court found no 
double jeopardy violation where the defendant was convicted of two counts of rape, as 
the evidence showed that despite the fact that each act occurred in the same bedroom, 
the defendant left the bedroom between each act and jury was properly instructed they 
had to consider each alleged act separately. Id. at 675 
Thus, while Idaho law does not generally require jury unanimity of the underlying 
facts supporting an element of the crime, where one crime is alleged to have been 
committed by alternative means and where the defendant is alleged to have committed 
separate and distinct criminal acts, Idaho law requires unanimity even if the acts are 
alleged in a single count. 
13 
C. The District Court Erred In Failing To Give A Unanimity Instruction, As 
Requested By Defense Counsel, Because Mr. Johnson Was Alleged To Have 
Committed Separate And Distinct Acts Of Battery As An Element Of The 
Domestic Violence Contained Charge In Count I 
Mr. Johnson does not assert that whenever the State charges a defendant with 
domestic violence, the jury must be unanimous in their determination of which act 
constituted the underlying battery (i.e., by restraining, slamming, hitting, etc.). However, 
the evidence presented at both the preliminary hearing and during the trial 
demonstrated that each of the batteries alleged in this case were not part of a 
continuing course of conduct, and unanimity was required. The evidence presented at 
the preliminary hearing demonstrated that there were multiple alleged acts, each 
separated in time (albeit a small amount of time) by one of the Johnsons moving into 
another room. (Tr. Prelim, p.7, L.7 - p.24, L.3.) The State's Information alleged, in both 
the conjunctive and the disjunctive that the battery occurred in multiple ways, i.e., "by 
restraining her, throwing her down, slapping her in the face, hitting her on the head, 
and/or by throwing her into a bathtub." (R., p.121.) All three of the witnesses to the 
disputed events described separate occurrences in their trial testimony. Ms. Johnson 
described pushing, grabbing by the arms and throwing around in the tub, in the 
bathroom (Tr., p.251, L.1 - p.255, L.7), then pushing and holding down in the bedroom 
(Tr., p.255, L.10 - p.256, L.18), followed by pushing down and restraining in the living 
room (Tr., p.258, L.17 - p.262 L.3), and finally grabbing and choking near the back door 
(Tr., p.262, L.4 - p.264, L.21). Each of these events was divided by discernible 
intervening time periods, where both she and Mr. Johnson went into different rooms and 
engaged in other behaviors. ( See generally Tr., p.251, L.1 - p.266, L.1 (Ms. Johnson's 
testimony regarding the October 5, 2011 incidents).) 
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Mr. Johnson testified to four separate incidents of physical contact between he 
and Ms. Johnson (bathroom where Ms. Johnson attacked him, he put his arms up in 
defense, she fell into the bathtub while he tried to catch her (Tr., p.408, L.10 - p.411, 
L.20), in the dining room where Ms. Johnson attacked him with a wind chime and he 
grabbed her arms to subdue her (Tr., p.412, L.4 - p.414, L.14), in the living room where 
Ms. Johnson was slapping and scratching him trying to retrieve the cell phone, where 
he pushed her backwards and got on top of her trying to subdue her (Tr., p.414, L.15 -
p.418, L.21), and finally near the back door where Ms. Johnson again pushed him and 
he held her against the wall telling her to stop attacking him finally ending when he let 
her go and Ms. Johnson and C.J. left (Tr., p.421, L.7 - p.423, L.21).) Again each of 
these events was divided by discernible intervening periods of time where the Johnsons 
were physically separated and doing something else. (See generally Tr., p.405, L.8 -
p.423, L.21 (Mr. Johnson's testimony regarding the October 5, 2011 incidents).) Even 
C.J. testified that the "yelling" was occurring in various rooms of the house. (See 
generally, Tr., p.482, L.1 - p.496, L.4 (testimony of C.J.).) 
Like the lewd conduct statute (I.C. 18-1508) examined in Miller and found not to 
contain a specific course of conduct prohibition, nothing in the battery statute or 
domestic violence statute (I.C. §§ 18-903, 18-918) suggests that the legislature 
intended to criminalize domestic violence as a "continuing course of conduct." While 
Severson stands for the proposition that where the defendant could necessarily only 
commit the crime alleged once, the jury is not required to unanimously determine which 
alleged acts constitute the actus reas, Miller stands for the proposition that where the 
defendant could commit the alleged crime multiple times, the jury must be unanimous in 
their determination of the defendant's actus reas if the '"conduct constituted separate, 
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distinct and independent crimes."' Miller at 267 (quoting State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 
33-34 (Ct. App. 1997) (applying this standard to determine whether double jeopardy 
would bar conviction for multiple alleged crimes). Reaching this determination '"requires 
an inquiry into the circumstances of the conduct and consideration of the "intent and 
objective of the actor."'" Id. (quoting Bush at 33-34 (in turn quoting State v. Major, 111 
Idaho 410,414 (1986)).) 
Thus, unlike the charge in Severson (or in State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970 
(2008) (unanimity not required as to whether the defendant committed the murder 
herself or aided and abetted another) and State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355 (2010) 
(unanimity not required in determining which of the parties to an alleged conspiracy 
committed which act in furtherance of the conspiracy)), Mr. Johnson was essentially 
alleged to have committed multiple batteries, each of which he could have been held 
liable for. He defended each of these alleged batteries by claiming he was acting in 
self-defense. Thus, while some jurors may have found that Mr. Johnson committed a 
battery in the bathroom, others may have found that the battery in the bathroom was 
justifiable, while still others may have found the State failed to prove that a battery 
occurred in the bathroom at all. The same can be said for each of the other three 
alleged acts. While perhaps not as obviously problematic as the scenario warned of by 
Justice Scalia in Schad ("We would not permit, for example, an indictment charging that 
the defendant assaulted either X on Tuesday or Y on Wednesday." Schad at 651 
(Scalia, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.)), the facts of this case -
separate, distinct, alleged batteries, with discernible time periods in between, and a 
claim of self-defense - demanded a unanimity instruction. Thus, the district court erred 
in failing to instruct the jury that they must be unanimous in their determination of which 
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of the alleged batteries constituted the necessary element of the domestic violence 
charge in Count I. 
D. The State Will Be Unable To Prove The Error Is Harmless Beyond A Reasonable 
Doubt 
"If the alleged error was followed by a contemporaneous objection at trial, 
appellate courts shall employ the harmless error test a1iiculated in Chapman [v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)]. Once the defendant meets his initial burden of 
showing that a violation occurred, the State then must demonstrate to the appellate 
court beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional violation did not contribute to 
the jury's verdict." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). As noted above, the jury 
heard testimony from Mr. Johnson, Ms. Johnson, and C.J., indicating that up to four 
separate incidents occurred on October 5th , 2011, and Mr. Johnson testified that he was 
acting in self-defense. The State will be unable to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the twelve jurors who deliberated and found Mr. Johnson guilty of domestic 
violence but not guilty of attempted strangulation for the October 5th events, as well as 
guilty of a lesser included offense for the domestic violence charge alleged to have 
occurred a week earlier, would have still found Mr. Johnson guilty in Count I had they 
been required to unanimously find which of the alleged batteries constituted the actus 
reus for that charge. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence In Light Of 
The Mitigating Factors That Exist In Tl·1is Case 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Johnson was acquitted of attempted strangulation; however, based upon the 
district court's belief that the jury must not have understood the attempted strangulation 
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elements instruction, and based upon uncharged, unproven allegations that 
Mr. Johnson had placed his hands on an ex-girlfriend's neck on multiple occasions, the 
district court, in essence, "aggravated"7 Mr. Johnson's sentence. Mr. Johnson asserts 
that the district court abused its discretion by failing to use due caution in concluding 
that Mr. Johnson attempted to strangle Ms. Johnson, and by failing to adequately 
consider the mitigating factors that exist in this case. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence In 
Light Of The Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case 
Mr. Johnson asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of 
fifteen years, with three years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.'" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Johnson does not allege that 
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, Mr. Johnson must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 
7 Mr. Johnson uses the term "aggravation" as an explanation that the district court 
sentenced him to a longer term than the court otherwise would have sentenced him. 
Mr. Johnson recognizes that his sentence is within the statutory maximum and does not 
use the term "aggravation" as a description of either an illegal sentence or as that term 
is used under the federal and some states' sentencing guideline jurisprudence. 
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Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 
(1992)). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection 
of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. 
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Coasso/o, 136 
Idaho 138 (2001 )). 
When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is (1) whether the lower 
court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within 
the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989), (citing Associates 
Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603 (Ct.App.1987)). "A sentencing court may, with 
due caution, consider the existence of defendant's alleged criminal activity for which no 
charges have been filed, or where charges have been dismissed." State v. Wicke!, 126 
Idaho 578, 581 (Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis added); CJ U.S. v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 
( 1997) (finding that a trial court may consider alleged criminal conduct for which a 
defendant has been acquitted provided the court finds the conduct to have occurred by 
a preponderance of the evidence.) 
During the sentencing hearing, counsel for Mr. Johnson argued that the jury likely 
believed the testimony of C.J., who testified that he never saw anything happen to his 
mother's neck despite the fact that both Mr. and Ms. Johnson agreed he was present, 
and asked the district court to retain jurisdiction based, in large part, upon the fact that 
Mr. Johnson accepts responsibility for the role he played in the confrontation and his 
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willingness to participate in treatment. (Tr., p.518, L.7 p.525, L.14.) Counsel noted 
that from the first time she met with Mr. Johnson, he expressed a desire for treatment 
both for his domestic violence issues and for his drug issues. (Tr., p.523, Ls.11-24.) 
Indeed, Mr. Johnson recognized that he '"should have never let it get to that point or 
gotten physically involved in the way [he] did. [H]e should have left immediately when 
the altercation began."' (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.)8 
Mr. Johnson's witnessed an appalling horror as a child. When he was six-years-
old, he saw his step-father beat his 12-year-old step brother so badly that he went into a 
coma from which he never emerged, dying seven years later. (PSI, p.8.) His mother 
was convicted of crime for failing to report the abuse, and Mr. Johnson was taken away 
first to live when his "'alcoholic' grandparents" and then to live in foster care. (PSI, p.8.) 
Mr. Johnson first used alcohol at age 12, marijuana at age 14, and methamphetamine 
at age 15. (PSI, pp.114-115.) He participated in a drug court program in 2009, but 
relapsed and had only '"brief moments"' of sobriety until 2011, when his use decreased, 
although he was on "spice" when he committed the instant offense. (PSI, pp.13, 23.) 
Despite his difficult upbringing, Mr. Johnson acknowledged, "he is an adult and 
understands that his childhood 'does not dictation his choices ' " (PSI, pp.8-9.) 
Furthermore, he stated, 'I am responsible for a domestic violence. I will be accountable 
and was wrong for my choices'" and further stated that he absolutely needs to get 
batterer's intervention treatment. (PSI, p.23.) The domestic violence evaluator who 
interviewed Mr. Johnson concluded that his primary problem is substance abuse but 
that participating in a 52-week domestic violence batterer program might be helpful and 
8 Citations to the "PSI" in this brief refer to the electronic file "39870 State v. Johnson 
PSI." 
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was recommended. (PSI, p.26.) During the sentencing hearing, Mr. Johnson again 
took responsibility and apologized for his actions, and he demonstrated insight into how 
his actions harmed C.J., through his witnessing of the altercations. (Tr., p.525, L.20 -
p.526, L.22.) 
While certainly not the only factor considered, the district court focused on the 
attempted strangulation allegation and prior uncharged and unproven allegations of 
strangulation,9 despite the jury's verdict acquitting him of the that charge, in crafting its 
sentence. (Tr. 4/4/12, p.527, L.9 - p.534, L.12.) In pronouncing sentence, the district 
court stated the following: 
First, on the guilty verdict by the jury, I find that you're guilty of 
Count One as well as Count Three. With regard to the attempted 
strangulation, I have only had one conviction for an attempted 
strangulation. Having listened to the testimony, I doubt very seriously it 
was because of [C.J.]'s testimony. It's the - I have problems with the 
attempted strangulation statute. Juries have problems with it They 
expect that there's going to be much more evidence tl1an there ever is in 
an attempted strangulation. In fact, the - not just the police reports, but 
also the reports from the hospital indicate that there were marks on her 
throat which substantiated her testimony. So I don't think it had anything 
to do with [C.J.]'s testimony at all. 
As the prosecutor pointed out, the things described by both women 
are remarkably similar. In both cases he puts his hands around their 
throat and squeezes. 
Now, the reason that the legislature decided to treat attempted 
strangulation differently is there is a recognition amongst people who deal 
in domestic violence, there is a big difference between someone who 
pushes and shoves or someone who slaps and someone who puts their 
hands around a woman's throat and tries to choke her. The difference is 
that you have to actually be looking at the person in most instances, so 
you know what it is you're doing. 
9 These allegations were made by an ex-girlfriend who was the victim of a prior battery 
committed by Mr. Johnson and who was interviewed by the police and the prosecutor 
as a potential I.R.E. 404(b) witness. (PSI, pp.7, 10-11, 96, 98-107.) 
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As I said, however, juries have problems with the elements of the 
crime. And I very - I only had one where the person was actually found 
guilty. 
So the mere fact that he was acquitted on that does not change the 
fact that the - both - both women describe remarkably similar activities 
and there was physical evidence to at least suggest that at least some 
portion of her version is correct. 
(Tr., p.527, L.11 - p.529, L.13.) 
While the district court clearly considered other factors (see Tr., p.529, L.13 -
p.532, L.24), the court's own belief that the jury, who heard all of the evidence, was 
simply confused by the jury instructions and were, therefore, wrong in their acquittal on 
the attempted strangulation charge demonstrates an abuse of discretion. The jury was 
instructed that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Johnson 
"willfully and unlawfully" "choked or attempted to strangle" Ms. Johnson. (R., p.123.) 
The jury was further instructed that "An act is 'wilful' (sic) or done 'wilfully' (sic) when 
done on purpose or with knowledge of the consequences. One can act wilfully (sic) 
without intending to violate the law, to injury another, or to acquire any advantage." 
(R., p.124.) The state presented expert testimony from Dr. Lee Binion who described 
the difference between choking (something caught in the windpipe) and strangulation 
(caused by external compression), the biological mechanics of strangulation, and the 
potential results of strangulation. (Tr., p.355, L.2 - p.379, L.20.) Most importantly, the 
jury heard from C.J. who testified that he never saw anything happen to his mother's 
neck despite being present when the alleged attempted strangulation occurred. 
(Tr., p.482, L.1 - p.496, L.4.) In short, there is simply nothing in the record to support 
the district court's conclusion that the jury misunderstood the instructions that they were 
given. The district court's belief that Mr. Johnson was guilty cannot substitute for that of 
the jury's belief that he was not guilty. 
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The district court's spurious conclusion that the jury did not understand the 
attempted strangulation jury instruction (and implied conclusion that the jury disbelieved 
C.J. and either disbelieved or did not understand Dr. Binion), demonstrates a failure to 
apply the due caution required of a Court when considering acquitted conduct. 10 Thus, 
Mr. Johnson asserts that the district court acted inconsistently with the applicable legal 
standards, thus abusing its discretion, when considering the alleged attempted 
strangulation as a factor counseling towards the sentence imposed. Mr. Johnson 
asserts that this undue consideration, coupled with the recognized mitigating factors of 
acceptance of responsibility, remorse and a willingness to seek treatment (see State v. 
Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v. Sanchez, 117 Idaho 51, 52 (Ct. App. 
1990); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991)), demonstrates that the district 
court executed an excessive sentence. 
1° Federal Courts are required to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the acts 
constituting prior alleged criminal conduct, for which the defendant had been acquitted, 
actually occurred in order to use those acts in aggravation under the federal sentencing 
guidelines. See U.S. v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997). Although the "due caution" 
standard is stated in terms of the district court considering uncharged or dismissed 
criminal conduct (see State v. Wicke!, 126 Idaho 578, 581 (Ct. App. 1994)), Mr. Johnson 
asserts that at a minimum the district court must use "due caution" when considering 
acquitted conduct as an aggravating factor under Idaho's unified sentencing scheme. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for Count 
I, domestic violence, and remand his case for further proceedings. Alternatively he 
respectfully requests that this Court remand his case to the district court with 
instructions that the court retain jurisdiction, to reduce his sentence as this Court deems 
appropriate, or to remand his case for a new sentencing hearing in front of a different 
district court judge. 
DATED this 2nd day of November, 2012. 
JASON G:--PINTLER ~1 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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